why not on the phones?
authorVolker Birk <vb@pep.foundation>
Wed, 24 Jan 2018 16:06:50 +0100
changeset 2443154269655c12
parent 2442 c8448057b91d
child 2445 c061bd2500bd
child 2448 b51c2cbb5bf8
why not on the phones?
src/pEpEngine.c
     1.1 --- a/src/pEpEngine.c	Wed Jan 24 14:30:53 2018 +0100
     1.2 +++ b/src/pEpEngine.c	Wed Jan 24 16:06:50 2018 +0100
     1.3 @@ -981,9 +981,6 @@
     1.4  
     1.5      // runtime config
     1.6  
     1.7 -#ifdef ANDROID
     1.8 -#elif TARGET_OS_IPHONE
     1.9 -#else /* Desktop */
    1.10      if (very_first)
    1.11      {
    1.12          // On first run, all private keys already present in PGP keyring 
    1.13 @@ -996,7 +993,7 @@
    1.14          //
    1.15          // Indeed, if pEpEngine did import spoofed private keys in previous
    1.16          // install, then those keys become automatically trusted in case 
    1.17 -        // pEp_management.db is deleted.
    1.18 +        // management.db is deleted.
    1.19          //
    1.20          // A solution to distinguish bare GPG keyring from pEp keyring is
    1.21          // needed here. Then keys managed by pEpEngine wouldn't be
    1.22 @@ -1020,7 +1017,6 @@
    1.23              }
    1.24          }
    1.25      }
    1.26 -#endif
    1.27  
    1.28      // sync_session set to own session by default
    1.29      // sync_session is then never null on a valid session